two sudokus down, one pending, and the drinking is insatiable, peering into the stack of books, there's a copy of seven years in tibet and in start to wonder: what sort of interesting life should ever produce a book? the majority of me is asking: really? 7 years in 7 sittings of reading this?! who imagines writing a book, having "completed" an interesting life, does not imagine the majority of the readership, discarding the actual book, and being tibet bound... jealousy is such a cheap emotion, to be honest jealousy is the cheapest of all emotions, cheaper to pay a ******* for an hour's service, than take a fine girl to dinner; what, was someone expecting an "oops" with that?
i sometimes can't imagine the quality of pop,
it's not a pedantic "observation" -
it's just: well, could have done better,
but then again: you clearly couldn't have.
i like rereading shakespeare and thinking
than minor additions would make the works
stand in greater clarification,
notably in shrapnel -
- 1st witch: why, how now, hecate?
you look angerly.
- hecate: have i not reason, beldams as you are,
saucy, and overbold? how did you dare to trade
and traffic with macbeth, in riddles,
and affairs of death,
and i, then mistress of your charms,
the close contriver of all harms,
was never called to bear my part,
or show the glory of our art?
such minor revisions, pedantic, of course...
i.e. - how did you dare to *trade and
make trivia with macbeth -
better still: trade & trivialise -
- in riddles, and in the affairs of death;
suppose we don't live in times
of man's "omniscience" etc.?
but we do, and categorising ourselves
as such, we can only seem to test
knowledge via answering trivia question -
the triviality of knowledge oozes out
of game shows: where enough to be
knowledgeable is enough to known the most
encyclopedic set of facts...
having to encompass all of man's
endeavours seems rather mundane...
heidegger's aphorism 91 ponderings VI...
and the arrogance of writings maxims /
you read them as if they are basically true,
but then again: they're written as
propositions, rather than as presuppositions...
there's not a single word in the works
of nietzsche or la rochefoucauld
that supposes an observation to be true:
a bit like the legal system dichotomy of
the english vs. the european courts:
a. innocent until proven guilty, vs.
b. guilty until proven innocent...
it's the ****** bombast of writing
maxims as propositions,
there's no room for "error":
said content is: necessarily true,
but unnecessarily observed;
most of the time maxim notation is
an erosion of common sense, and subsequently
the killer proteins of alzheimer eating
away at the fatty tissue of the brain...
who the hell wants a schwarzenegger's worth
of brain, i.e. exercise what?
i don't like nietzsche's style precisely
because i don't like aphorisms or maxims...
they're bombastic in assuming they're
i.e. once observed: forever replicated
to the same summa summarum...
i think it's unsavoury to presume that one's
observations are fit for purpose of replica
observations taking hold of the reader...
if, perhaps, these aphorisms were written with
an overtone of presupposition,
and left in the la la land of: supposing so -
they would be guarded by an element
an encroachment moment,
with an element of surprise...
if only the loss of propositional bombast,
and the mediation of supposing-so,
with an undertone of prepositional discretion...
stating the obvious in that stating
the obvious is stating an: unchallenged truth,
an unchallenged observation shared between
to people, well, aren't we talking about
simply observing the perpetuated plagiarism
of what is "observed", without ever
deviating back into the "unobservable"?
i believe that aphorisms (as a medium)
are plagued by a certainty inversion -
sure, they're true, but they are also
true without a guarantee of replica -
for the most part they are placebo
and the only aspect of philosophy
that is unscientific...
for the most part the style of writing
that's aphoristic is placebo,
and not res replica...
unless offensively forced - stereotyped.
if only the writing of an aphorism was
plagued by presupposing rather than proposing
a conclusive play on a voyeuristic act -
the presuppositional attention to detail
would be tactful - and part of the cartesian
but propositional observations,
akin to making stereotypes, have no element
of founding one's thought in the cartesian dynamism
of doubt... there either is, or there isn't -
existentialism akin to the genesis in nietzsche
was born with the cartesian roller-coaster
of fusing an emotional regard for feeling,
i.e. doubt... negation being the prime ingredient
in existentialism, is oh so boring...
ego negare, ego quasi cogito - ergo..
i deny, i sort of think -
pretty obvious, we had to change the song -
we know so much already, in the current times,
that doubting would be pointless -
doubting used to have a thrill of purpose
never being finalised,
existentialism replaced doubt with denial...
so few things can be doubted,
and when so few things can be doubted,
we purposively lie, deny, lie, deny, to somehow
muster an origination of awe in emotive
experiences, which only bring failure -
awe does not coexist with denial -
you can't be in awe via purposively lying
you can only seek awe by being forced
into an emotional system of doubt...
but since existentialism eradicated doubt and replaced
it with denial...
as already mentioned:
we deny, therefore, we sort-of think -
we deny, therefore, we "think";
as the zeitgeist suggests - robotics, and other
forms of automation are taking over.
the argument still stands:
if only the medium of writing aphorisms,
or succinct "truths" could be universally tested,
or at least universally observed as being true...
if only there was a lost propositional(!) bombast
behind these pieces of writing,
or rather: a presupposition(?),
since both approaches still converge in the realm
a position is taken and one is for it -
while a supposing is given and one predates
it with a spontaneous unearthing of unnecessarily
having an opinion about it -
to presuppose is to not suppose -
since presuppositions are more archaic in always
being unforced observations,
whereas propositions are enforced results
of having forced oneself to think: about something
with the end result of: a maxim,
or the extended maxim, i.e. an aphorism.
- so who would actually want to make
language, and easy, and accessible, to the majority
did not the power reside among
the priesthood who spoke latin, while the general
so why would anyone not decide upon:
speaking an english, within english,
that the common englishman could not understand?