i. the lost necessity of narration in philosophical books
it might be worth pointing out how the practice of philosophy
crumbled with the old debate rekindled,
i never understood why so much narrative was injected
into what defines philosophy, and why no poet dared
to comment on this, rather choosing to engage with the ideas
like a tennis ball against a brick wall,
by way of showing some sort of respect for the study,
but surely this is a rickety chair approach,
if it isn’t then why would such a prominent 20th century example
cite a universal malady, although not so universal,
in that the citation: we’re still not thinking
by heidegger is a direct result of the philosophical narrative,
the fact that there’s narrative in philosophy automates itself
in the above citation - for how can thought be utilised to claim
autonomy from not thinking if it cannot begin in the realm of
philosophy by loosing the plot... quiet literally although
the joyous connotation of the phrase’s everyday usage is also there,
i.e. not being content with the need for a philosophical narrative?
it is sometimes the scarceness of poetry that prevents narration
thus allowing much thought to enter and fill the void.

ii. sartre v. the cartesian dialectic
on a technical note though, what i noticed most prominently from
sartre’s being and nothingness is this:
to usurp the faculty of doubt within thought into a dialectical translation of being.
what does sartre attempt to usurp this cartesian dialectic with?
denial.
he purposively uses denial (negation) to take doubt out from the cartesian dialectic,
this sort of change of faculty is perfectly translatable in modern times,
there is either complete denial or complete affirmation of life,
although a stumbling block emerges - what of all natural obstructions, like
the negation of ease, in the many diseases that plague people?
surely due to the negation (dis-) of ease there is no affirmation of the one
prominent aspect of ease, the ease of thinking, then doesn’t sartre’s attempt
stumble against this? i am am denied ease i am denied thinking,
therefore the need to usurp doubt from the cartesian dialectic is lost
in such instances as necessary.
in summary the concept does extend into the proposed bad faith,
for denial that usurps doubt in the cartesian dialectic that precipitates
into being enters the realm of non-being, and here too provides
what sartre deemed damnable in descartes, for nothingness is also a substance,
it isn’t a quality-based assumption, because there is no thing
in existence that has qualities of nothingness, ergo nothingness is also
a substance.

iii. systematisation in philosophy
it’s not quiet as nietzsche contended, that systematisation in philosophy
is a sign of being dishonest; to me it’s more about the effective use
of a constrained vocabulary, or rather an effective use of a desirable vocabulary.

iv. a necessary revision*
perhaps the only reason why i’d revise the cartesian dialectic,
and not do it like sartre is by simply stating - solipsism:
a doubt that that the self is all that can be known to exist -
hence the lost need to theorise solipsism, whether in the cartesian
dialectic or an existential dialectic - or to use solipsism as a crutch,
a safe haven for a narrative to cling to.